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Introduction
In 2002, a new international institution arrived as the International
Criminal Court (ICC) opened its doors in The Hague.' At the time of this
writing there are ninety-two states parties, which have met on three occa-
sions during 2003.2 They elected the Court's first eighteen judges in Feb-
ruary and its Chief Prosecutor in April. The Court itself has hit the ground
running. The new Prosecutor has not begun any formal investigations but
announced, in July, that he is closely following the situation in the Ituri
province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where, in recent months,
brutal killings, torture and rape have taken place.
3
The establishment of the ICC is the culmination of a process that
began with the Nuremberg trials more than half a century ago, whereby
1. The Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002, two months after
the 60th ratification according to Article 126 of the Statute. Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/roefra.htm.
2. States Parties include many of the U.S.'s closest allies: all of the European Union,
Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Canada and Australia. Russia has signed the
Statute but not yet ratified. A total of 143 States have either signed or become party to
the treaty. States that have remained outside the treaty so far include the U.S. and Israel
(both of which signed but subsequently "unsigned" the treaty), North Korea, India and
Pakistan. Japan is actively preparing to become a party and China has indicated that it
is considering doing so. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Presses U.N. to Extend War Crimes Court
Exemption, WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at A16.
3. Report of the Prosecutor of the ]CC, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo to the Second Assem-
bly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (Sept. 8,
2003), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/030909-prosecutor-speech.pdf.
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governments have agreed to work together to ensure justice for the world's
worst human rights abusers. The last generation of tyrants like Pol Pot, Idi
Amin and Stalin went unpunished. Augusto Pinochet and Saddam Hus-
sein have felt the heat. Slobadan Milosevic and the leaders of the Rwandan
genocide have actually been brought before a court to answer for their
crimes. International law developed during the twentieth century from a
situation where what went on inside a state was no one else's business to a
coherent framework and accepted set of norms intended to ensure that per-
petrators of mass atrocities can be pursued wherever they go.
While half the world's states are working together to set up this global
mechanism to punish and deter genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes, the U.S. is absent from the table. Worse, since the start of the
Bush presidency, U.S. representatives have been actively undermining the
new Court. More recently, the administration's attack has gone beyond the
ICC alone and has begun to pose a broader threat to cooperative efforts by
national judiciaries to make sure that no safe haven exists for those who
commit the worst of crimes. The implications of these actions are
profound, both for the ICC and for international law. At the same time, the
United States has been vigorously pursuing a global "war on terrorism,"
sparked largely by the attacks of September 11, 2001, for which it has been
drumming up international support for some of the very principles of col-
lective action it is undermining in its actions concerning the ICC. One
result of this inconsistency is that due to its non-cooperation in tackling
impunity for human rights crimes, the United States. risks losing the inter-
national cooperation it seeks on other fronts, and is thus doing serious
harm to its own interests.
I. The ICC and Terrorism
Would the ICC have been more acceptable to the United States if its
jurisdiction included terrorism? Acts of terrorism, as such, are not
included in the list of crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. The Rome Stat-
ute includes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, with the
crime of aggression to be added if and when a definition can be agreed on
at a future review conference. During the Rome Statute negotiations the
possibility of including certain acts of terrorism, already prohibited in
international treaties, was discussed, but a majority of states opposed
inclusion, viewing these acts as crimes of a different character for which
effective systems of international cooperation were already in place, and
they were ultimately not included. 4 There was also the problem of reaching
agreement on a definition. But to acknowledge the strongly held views of
some states, the Final Act of the Rome Conference included a recommen-
dation that a future review conference consider adding the crimes of terror-
ism and drug crimes to the Court's jurisdiction.
4. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 81 (Roy
Lee ed., 1999).
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Many believe that major acts of terrorism such as the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon are of a sufficiently serious nature to
meet the threshold required to qualify as a crime against humanity under
Article 7 of the Rome Statute.5 In fact, this same point was made by the
ICC's Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, who recently said the
United States was passing up a potential weapon in the war against terror-
ism by refusing to cooperate with the ICC.6
Despite their absence from the Rome Statute, acts of terrorism have
been condemned as criminal acts in several international treaties.
Although there is as yet no comprehensive treaty on international terror-
ism, many international and regional treaties cover specific acts, including
the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971, 7 the Convention against the Taking of Hos-
tages of 1979,8 and the 1998 International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings. 9
Interestingly, there is a lot of convergence between the treaties dealing
with the suppression of terrorism and those dealing with human rights,
particularly in how they deal with the question of international coopera-
tion in pursuing individuals accused of committing prohibited acts. Sev-
eral of the terrorism treaties require states parties to criminalize specific
acts and impose an obligation on states to either prosecute suspects or
extradite them to stand trial elsewhere. This aut dedere aut judicare (extra-
dite or prosecute) formula appears in very similar form in human rights
treaties such as the U.N. Convention against Torture. Both sets of conven-
tions demand that in appropriate circumstances states exercise extraterri-
torial jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction over acts not committed within
their territory, in order to pursue the common interest of ensuring that
such persons do not escape justice.
II. U.S. Attitude Towards International Cooperation and
Extraterritorial Reach to Combat Terrorism and Serious
Human Rights Crimes
If one looks to see what approach the United States has taken domesti-
cally to apply these two sets of international provisions, one dealing with
terrorism and the other with human rights atrocities, the picture begins to
look rather more uneven. In both legislation and practice, the U.S. has
gone further in relation to terrorism than in relation to genocide, crimes
5. See, e.g., David Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court,
35 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 47 (2001/2002). "The terrorist assaults of September 11, 2001 on
the United States were crimes against humanity that probably would have fallen within
the jurisdiction of the ICC had the Court existed on that date." Id. at 49.
6. James Podgers, An Unused Weapon, A.B.A. JOURNAL REPORT, (Sept. 19, 2003), at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/s19terror.html (reporting on the Prosecutor's
remarks during the International Bar Association meeting in San Francisco).
7. Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.ST. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
8. Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081.
9. G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc. A/52/653 (1998).
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against humanity or war crimes. As regards terrorism, at least eight pieces
of legislation have been introduced that establish criminal extraterritorial
jurisdiction of U.S. courts for acts including aircraft hijacking, violence at
international airports, hostage taking, transactions involving nuclear
materials, murder of foreign officials, and violence against maritime navi-
gation or platforms. 10 These were largely enacted in order to implement
international treaties that the United States ratified or in response to spe-
cific acts of terrorism. They have been invoked on a number of occasions,
inter alia to prosecute a Lebanese national for hijacking a Jordanian plane
in Beirut," to prosecute one of the World Trade Center bombers for plac-
ing a bomb on a Philippines Airlines flight en route for Japan 1 2 and to
prosecute a Palestinian for hijacking an Egyptian plane on a flight from
Athens. 13
Turning to human rights crimes, the U.S. record is less commendable
in terms of its willingness to use domestic instruments in order to play a
cooperative role in global efforts to suppress offences. Only in relation to
torture has the United States legislated to establish broad extraterritorial
jurisdiction. After becoming party to the U.N. Convention against Torture,
Congress enacted legislation making it an offense to commit torture
outside the United States, and conferring jurisdiction on U.S. courts,
where the alleged offender is a U.S. national or is present in the United
States.14 To date, no prosecutions have been brought under this provision.
On war crimes, although a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
which require states parties to "search for persons alleged to have commit-
ted, or to have ordered to be committed ... grave breaches, and ... bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts" if it
does not extradite them,' 5 the War Crimes Act only allows U.S. courts to
hear cases relating to offences committed outside the U.S. if the offence is
committed by or against a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a U.S.
national. 16 Similarly, the Genocide Act only applies to offenses committed
within the United States, or when the alleged offender is a U.S. national. 1 7
10. These are 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2000) (destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 18
U.S.C. § 37 (2000) (violence at international airports), 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2000) (prohib-
ited transactions involving nuclear materials), 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (2000) (murder or man-
slaughter of foreign officials, official guests or internationally protected persons), 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (kidnapping of internationally protected persons outside the
U.S.), 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000) (hostage taking), 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2000) (Violence
against maritime navigation) and 18 U.S.C. § 2281 (2000) (violence against maritime
fixed platforms).
11. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
12. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
13. United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
15. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Person in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000).
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Despite this mixed record domestically, the United States has certainly
not been opposed to all multilateral efforts to combat impunity. The U.S.
was, of course, a leading player in the Nuremberg trials following the Sec-
ond World War. More recently, it supported the establishment and opera-
tion of ad hoc international or hybrid criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
The United States has also, at least under previous administrations,
cooperated somewhat in efforts by other national legal systems to imple-
ment the aut dedere aut judicare principle. When Chilean ex-dictator
Augusto Pinochet was being investigated in Spain, the Clinton Administra-
tion was asked to open intelligence files and eventually did. Official eye-
brows, however, were raised when Henry Kissinger was summoned to
submit to questioning by Spanish and French investigating judges in rela-
tion to the Pinochet case. Kissinger refused.
The Bush Administration has raised serious objections to other coun-
tries exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction for serious human rights
crimes only when U.S. citizens have been directly involved. But in such
cases, the reaction has been extreme. When complaints were laid before a
Belgian investigating judge in April 2003 asking for an investigation of
Tommy Franks and George Bush for possible war crimes committed in
Iraq, the resulting furor from Washington was so overwhelming that the
Belgian government bowed to U.S. pressure and amended the law on which
the complaint was based. 18
It is interesting in considering the attitude of the Clinton Administra-
tion when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
looked into the NATO bombings in Kosovo, in which U.S. forces played a
major part, to speculate as to how the Bush Administration would have
reacted to such scrutiny of the actions of U.S. forces by an international
tribunal. Of course, Clinton would have rigorously defended any prosecu-
18. See Belgium Moves to Limit War Crimes Law, Repair U.S. Ties, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2003, at A6. In 1993, Belgium enacted a Law for the Suppression of Grave Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, permitting prosecutions for genocide, serious war
crimes and crimes against humanity in Belgian courts, wherever they were committed.
Although many other countries have universal jurisdiction for certain crimes under
international law, the Belgian legislation was among the widest in terms of the scope of
crimes covered and the access for victims to file information with an investigating judge.
However only one case was completed; four Rwandans were convicted for their role in
the genocide of 1994. In April 2003, the government amended the law for the first time
following the filing of cases against several foreign leaders including former President
George Bush in relation to the Gulf War of 1991, introducing government discretion on
whether to proceed in cases with no direct link to Belgium, in an attempt to filter out
politically motivated complaints. But then, in June 2003, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld threatened to withhold American funding for a new NATO headquarters in
Belgium after complaints were filed with an investigating judge against George Bush,
General Tommy Franks and others in relation to the war in Iraq. In July, the Belgian
Parliament and Senate passed a second law restricting the jurisdiction of Belgian courts
further, requiring a close link to Belgium. Although the Belgian Prime Minister denied
that the changes were in direct response to U.S. pressure, officials had admitted that the
changes would have been unlikely without that pressure.
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tion had it ensued, but tolerated the review of the tribunal. 19
The United States does have a unique jurisdiction allowing victims of
violations of international law to sue perpetrators when they are physically
present in the country, under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture
Victim Protection Act. These statutes enable U.S. courts to provide a forum
for victims of universally condemned conduct that occurs anywhere in the
world, when other avenues are not available. 20 Cases have been success-
fully brought for genocide, torture, extrajudicial murder, and other serious
violations of human rights. Although cases of terrorism have not yet been
successfully brought against individuals under these statutes, some believe
it is only a matter of time, because international consensus probably exists
to condemn certain acts of terrorism, such as hijacking and hostage tak-
ing.2 1 Since 1998, an amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
has permitted civil actions against foreign states "for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources
for such an act," but only if the foreign state is designated as a state spon-
sor of terrorism. 2 2 Since then a number of cases have been filed against
Libya, Iran and other states for both human rights violations and acts of
terrorism.
III. The ICC and U.S. Opposition During the Negotiations
Under the Clinton Administration, the United States was actively
engaged in negotiations for the establishment of the ICC. President Clin-
ton said frequently that the world needs a permanent international crimi-
nal court. Under his presidency U.S. negotiators played a key role in
shaping many aspects of the text of the Statute itself, as well as of two
important supplemental documents, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence.
Nevertheless, throughout the negotiations, the U.S. team maintained
serious differences of opinion with the majority of other states on funda-
19. The Prosecutor of the ICTY established a committee to review the several com-
plaints made regarding NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999. The committee recom-
mended, in 2000, that a formal investigation was not warranted. Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, 55th Sess., Agenda item 52, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/55/273 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2000/AR00e.pdf.
20. The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), provides that: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Enacted in
1789, the Statute was originally intended to apply to acts of piracy, and was taken up in
a line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), that
deal with serious violations of human rights on which there is universal consensus in
the international community. The Torture Victim Protection Act was enacted in 1992
and allows civil actions for torture or extrajudicial killing. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
21. Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combating Terrorism
Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX. INT'L LJ. 169, 205 (1987).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000).
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mental aspects. The question of what should be the basis of the Court's
jurisdiction was the central bone of contention. The U.S. opposed the
Court having jurisdiction over nationals of states that were not party to the
Treaty, except in situations that would be referred to the Court by the
Security Council. During the negotiations, the U.S. pressed continuously
for a regime based on the principle of state consent, favoring an opt-in
system for listed crimes (other than for genocide), rather than a system
whereby the Court would automatically have jurisdiction when certain pre-
conditions were met.23
In the end the jurisdictional regime agreed to in the final package was
a compromise: the Court would be able to exercise jurisdiction if either the
territorial state or the state of nationality of the accused is a Party to the
Statute (or has accepted its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis). In addition,
the Court would have jurisdiction over situations referred to it by the U.N.
Security Council exercising its Chapter VII powers. This was reflected in
Article 12 of the Rome Statute. The only exception was the optional opt-
out for war crimes for a limited period located exclusively in Article 124.
This outcome meant that in certain circumstances, nationals of non-State
Parties could be "caught" by the court's jurisdiction. This could occur, for
instance, if a national of a non-state party were to commit a crime within
the territory of a State Party.
Despite remaining concerns, President Clinton eventually signed the
Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, the last possible day for signature of
the treaty. 24 Upon signing the Statute, Clinton issued a statement recog-
nizing that there were "significant flaws" in the treaty and recommending
that his successor not submit it to the Senate for ratification until the U.S.'s
fundamental concerns were satisfied.25 In fact it had long been thought
that Congress would not ratify and that therefore the U.S. would not be in a
position to become a party to the treaty for some time to come. Attention,
23. Several options were considered by states during the negotiations. Under the
original International Law Commission's draft, the Court would have inherent or auto-
matic jurisdiction if a complaint was brought by a state that was also party to the Geno-
cide Convention; for other crimes the jurisdiction of the Court over the crime must have
been accepted by the territorial state or the custodial state in an "opt-in" system (varia-
tions on an opt-in system were discussed during the negotiations). Others proposed
universal jurisdiction, on the basis that since international law permits universal juris-
diction for the crimes under the Rome Statute, the Court should be in the same position
to exercise jurisdiction as states were themselves, and that the Court should have juris-
diction over anyone regardless of whether or not any particular state was party to the
Statute. A third option, which ultimately prevailed, was that the Court could exercise
jurisdiction automatically, without the need for state consent, if certain states (options
included the territorial state, the custodial state, the state of nationality of the accused or
the state of which the victim is a national) were party.
24. After that date, according to Article 125(1) of the Rome Statute, a state would
have to accede in order to become a party. See Scheffer, supra note 5, as the chief U.S.
negotiator under Clinton, he explains the reasons why the President signed the Rome
Statute.
25. See Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes Tribunal: Pentagon, Repub-
licans Object to Clinton Move, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al (quoting President
Clinton).
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early on, had therefore focused on the question of the status of non-State
Parties. In signing, President Clinton restated the U.S. concern that the
Court would claim jurisdiction over personnel of states that are not party
to the treaty. However he said that as a signatory, the U.S. would be in a
position to influence the evolution of the Court-whereas without signing,
it would not.
First among U.S. concerns remains the fact that the Court has juris-
diction over nationals of non-parties. To others, the principle that states
have jurisdiction over the crimes in the Statute was already well established
under international law; states are entitled to do collectively what they are
permitted to do individually, and may agree to confer the power onto a
judicial body that they establish.
The ICC regime is entirely consistent with international law. Nation-
als of non-State Parties to international treaties that have the purpose of
preventing and punishing crimes under international law have long been
exposed to potential prosecution without the consent of their governments.
The U.S. itself has accepted this by becoming party to treaties such as the
Geneva Conventions and the U.N. Convention against Torture, and agree-
ments relating to terrorism, which oblige parties to pursue those suspected
of committing the relevant crimes regardless of whether they are a national
of a state that is party to the treaty in question. Customary international
law also permits states to cooperate in combating impunity for crimes
under international law, including exercising criminal jurisdiction. 26 Offi-
cial State Department policy supports this view.2 7 The line of cases in U.S.
courts brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act has involved U.S. courts in
examining international norms in order to determine which acts have been
generally recognized by states as of such seriousness that their prohibition
and punishment by all meets with overwhelming approval. Although these
are civil cases, in carrying out the exercise of identifying principles that are
"universal, definable, and obligatory international norms '' 28 governing the
circumstances in which U.S. courts may assert jurisdiction in order to
offer redress for victims of universally condemned acts, U.S. courts have
drawn on the principles of international criminal law. 29
26. While there is disagreement as to precisely which crimes give rise to universal
jurisdiction under customary international law, there is broad agreement that the duty
to combat impunity for serious crimes of international concern exists.
27. The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, at
§ 404, provides that: "A State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offences recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such
as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and per-
haps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in
§ 402 is present." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987).
28. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
29. The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 404,
supra note 27, specifies that universal jurisdiction is not limited to criminal law and that
international law does not preclude its application, for instance, by providing a remedy
in tort.
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It is puzzling why the U.S. would appear to accept-through its own
adoption of universal jurisdiction for certain crimes and its recognition of
the principle of universal jurisdiction-that exceptional extraterritorial
jurisdiction could be exercised by the judiciary of one country over nation-
als of another state for crimes of international concern, but reject the idea
that such jurisdiction could be conferred upon an international tribunal.
Concerns about politically motivated prosecutions would seem to be far
more justified in relation to the former, with the real possibility of sham
prosecutions by rogue states. The ICC, with its plethora of safeguards and
due process guarantees-many of which were put in place partly as a result
of U.S. insistence-and dominated by U.S. allies, would appear to be a con-
siderably safer option. 30
IV. U.S. Opposition to the ICC under the Bush Administration
In a presage of things to come, in July 1998, shortly following the
adoption of the Rome Statute, John Bolton, then Senior Vice President of
the American Enterprise Institute, appeared before a hearing of the Sub-
committee on International Operations of the U.S. Senate and said: "we
should oppose any suggestion that we cooperate, help fund or generally
support the work of the prosecutor. We should isolate and ignore the ICC
.... This approach is likely to maximize the chances that the ICC will
wither and collapse, which should be our objective." 3 1 Under the Bush
Administration, Bolton became Undersecretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security, and was given the opportunity to implement
this policy. As a first step, the U.S. completely disengaged from the ICC.
On May 6, 2002, Bolton signed a letter to the U.N. Secretary General,
informing him that "the United States does not intend to become a party to
the treaty" and asserting that: "Accordingly, the United States has no legal
obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000."32 The U.S.
has remained disengaged ever since, refusing to participate in inter-govern-
mental discussions relating to the ICC despite constant invitations to do
SO.
3 3
30. While the U.S. disputed the assertion that states are entitled to delegate to an
international court established by treaty the power they each have individually to prose-
cute crimes under international law, former lead U.S. negotiator David Scheffer makes it
clear that at least as important in U.S. strategy under the Clinton Administration was
the more pragmatic need to obtain protection as a non-State Party in order to build
domestic support for eventually becoming party to the treaty. See Scheffer, supra note 5.
31. Is A U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. Pm International Operations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 105th Cong. 48-64 (1998) (statement of John Bolton, Senior V.P., American Enter-
prise Institute), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/SIOC7-23 98.pdf.
32. See Lydia Adetunji & Carola Hoyos, US to Draw Sharp Criticism for World Court
Withdrawal, FIN. TIMES, May, 7 2002, at P6 (quoting Under-Secretary John Bolton).
33. As a non-State Party, the U.S. would be entitled to attend meetings of the Assem-
bly of States Parties as an observer. While allies have made many calls for the U.S. to
engage, the European Union issued an official invitation to the U.S. to engage in dia-
logue on U.S. re-engagement in the ICC process, practical cooperation in specific cases
and other matters. Draft Council Conclusions on the ICC, COUNCIL OF THE E.U., 12386/02
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The Bush Administration took steps aimed at ensuring that the U.S.
would not cooperate in any way with the ICC. Congress enacted the Amer-
ican Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA), which was signed into law on
August 2, 2002. 3 4 The ASPA prohibits U.S. cooperation with the ICC
unless the President determines that cooperation would be in the national
interest. The Act also grants authority to the President to "use all means
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of nationals of the
U.S. or its allies if they are detained by the ICC-a provision that has led to
the ASPA being known in the Netherlands, the seat of the Court, as the
"Hague Invasion Act."
Next, the Administration began to aggressively pursue mechanisms for
obtaining iron-clad protections for U.S. nationals from the ICC. The first
major initiative, in that direction, came in July 2002, when the Bush
Administration threatened to pull out of peacekeeping operations in Bos-
nia unless the Security Council adopted a resolution preventing the ICC
from pursuing personnel from non-States Parties participating in such
operations. Under heavy U.S. pressure, the Security Council eventually
passed Resolution 1422, which provided that the Security Council, "Acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter":
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the RS, that the ICC,
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a
contributing state not a party to the RS over acts or omissions relating to a
UN established or authorized operation, shall for a 12 month period start-
ing 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution
of any such case, unless the S.C. decides otherwise. 3 5
Although through Resolution 1487, adopted on June 12, 2003, was
renewed for a further year, the provision has by no means achieved broad
acceptance. 3 6 Widespread unease about the lawfulness and implications
of the resolution were voiced both in 2002 and in 2003. Concerns cen-
tered on the fact that the Council was, in effect, amending the Rome Stat-
ute, and that giving exemptions to some would weaken the ICC and impair
its authority. 3 7 One of the fundamental principles underlying the Rome
COJUR 9 USA 35 PESC 369, (Sept. 30, 2002) (Brussels), available at http://www.icnow.
org/documents/declarationsresolutions/intergovbodies/EUConclusions30SeptO2.pdf.
34. Pub. L No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820 (American Service Members Act 22 U.S.C.
§ 7401 et seq. (2002)).
35. U.N. SCOR 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1422 (2002), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/7a399ae94254b5elcl256
c8b003bafOa?Opendocument.
36. U.N. SCOR 58th Sess., 4772d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1487 (2003), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/2e33a298d7b1215fc l256
d4700270d48?Opendocument.
37. Canada stated that the Security Council has acted ultra vires through resolution
1422 since it is not allowed to "change the negotiated terms of any treaty it wished .... "
Paul Heinbecker, Ambassador and permanent Representative of Canada to the United
Nations at the tenth session of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC (July 3, 2002),
at http://www.iccnow.org. According to Germany "Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter requires the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression, none of which, in our view, is present in this case. The Security Council
would thus be running the risk of undermining its own authority and credibility." U.N.
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Statute is that no one is immune from prosecution for ICC crimes, reinforc-
ing the principles of the rule of law and of equality before the law. Many
were also concerned that the Security Council was abusing its powers by
adopting a resolution supposedly using its Chapter VII powers, but that
could not be justified on the basis of any threat to international peace and
security. Basing the resolution on Chapter VII powers was tantamount to
saying that the ICC itself constituted a threat to international peace and
security or an impediment to peacekeeping. In reality any threat that did
exist had been entirely manufactured by the U.S. when it threatened to veto
the Bosnia peacekeeping resolution. Another concern was that 1422 con-
tradicted the carefully constructed relationship between the Security Coun-
cil and the ICC carved out in the Rome Statute as mentioned above. Article
16 of the Statute, which allows the Council to request that the ICC defer
consideration of a case for a period of one year, was intended to be used on
a case by case basis and not as a general power conferring blanket exemp-
tions on any class of persons, or permitting an indefinite or permanent
immunity. 38 Nevertheless, the concern that the U.S. might withdraw from
international peacekeeping missions ensured that Resolutions 1422 and
1487 were adopted.
Both when the original draft of Resolution 1422 was presented in
2002, and again when it was presented for renewal in 2003, states not on
the Security Council were sufficiently troubled that they took the unusual
step of requesting an open meeting at which non-members could express
their views, On each occasion U.S. allies, and even many non-State Parties
to the Rome Statute, presented strong concerns and objections, most
stressing that the provision should not be regarded as permanent. In 2003,
three states on the Security Council, France, Germany and Syria, felt una-
ble to vote for the renewal of Resolution 1422 and abstained.
In July 2003, the U.S. introduced a resolution in the Security Council
that went even further. This time it was a clause in a resolution authorizing
the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Liberia. Operative paragraph 7
of Resolution 1497 reads as follows:
The Security Council, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations...
7. Decides that current or former officials or personnel from a contribut-
ing State, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that con-
tributing State for all alleged acts of omissions arising out of or related
to the Multinational Force or United Nations stabilization force in Libe-
ria, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
SCOR 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., at 9, U.N. DOC. S/PV.4568 (2002) (Remarks of
Schumacher).
38. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan told members he believed Article 16 was
intended to cover more specific requests relating to a particular situation. Press Release,
In Statement to Security Council, Secretary-General Voices Concerns Over Extending
UN Peacekeepers' Immunity From ICC Action, U.N. Press Release, SG/SM/8749, SC/
7790 (Dec. 6, 2003).
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contributing State .... 39
Paragraph 7 was intended not only to exempt personnel of the mul-
tinational force from the clutches of the ICC, but also to place them beyond
the reach of any other jurisdiction other than its own courts. In other
words, the U.S. was now taking on not only the ICC, but also the broader
international norm that permits or requires states to pursue perpetrators
of serious international crimes and ensure that they are brought to trial
somewhere-the principle aut dedere autjudicare. Most national legal sys-
tems do include expressions of this principle for certain crimes of interna-
tional concern, and many also reserve the right to pursue suspects on the
basis of principles of jurisdiction long recognized by international law
including active personality (the nationality of the accused), passive per-
sonality (the nationality of the victim) and the protective principle (the
state's national interests). Paragraph 7 also seeks to override a state's own
territorial jurisdiction, as it would require a host state to return an individ-
ual to his own state. Although states do frequently agree to allocate juris-
diction between themselves in situations where there might be concurrent
jurisdiction, particularly where military personnel are sent to another
country,40 the purpose of such agreements (such as Status of Forces agree-
ments) is to recognize the primary right-and indeed duty-of the sending
State to prosecute persons under their control, and not to encourage impu-
nity. Those regular agreements are consistent with international law,
including the principle of complementarity that underlies the Rome
Statute.
In relation to the Liberian resolution, U.S. representatives again took
advantage of an emergency situation in order to push the resolution
through. As the Security Council hesitated, balking at what the U.S. was
trying to do, casualties were mounting in Liberia. Despite this, again three
Security Council states felt unable to vote for the resolution and
abstained.4 1 In explanation, the three stated that paragraph 7 created a
dangerous precedent which contravened not only the International Crimi-
nal Court Statute but also states' domestic law and international law. 4 2
Mexico said that this was a move towards the institutionalization of impu-
nity. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "Frankly my sentiments are
with those countries that abstained."
Obtaining temporary blanket exemptions for U.S. peacekeepers
through the Security Council was apparently not thought by the Bush
Administration to offer sufficient protection from the ICC, and soon after
39. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4803d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1497 (2003), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/fald822a06484827c256
d900029 ld5e?Opendocument.
40. It is common for Status of Forces agreements and Status of Mission agreements
to allocate who has jurisdiction and to oblige a state receiving military forces to return
home nationals of a sending state when a crime has been committed on the receiving
state's territory.
41. This time it was France, Germany, and Mexico that abstained.
42. U.N. Doc., Press Release CS/2534, August 1, 2003.
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the "unsigning" of the Statute in 2002, officials started seeking other forms
of guarantees. Emerging from the vote on Security Council Resolution
1422 on July 12, 2002, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Negroponte
announced that the resolution was just a first step in protecting U.S. citi-
zens from the ICC, and that the U.S. would use the coming year to find
additional protections, including "bilateral agreements expressly contem-
plated in Article 98 of the Rome Statute."4 3 During the months that fol-
lowed, the Bush Administration set out to obtain-often to wrest-from
states bilateral agreements that prohibit the surrender of U.S. nationals to
the ICC.
Despite Ambassador Negroponte's assertion, these agreements are
incompatible with Article 98 of the Rome Statute, and directly contradict
the very purpose of the Statute as well as other international norms. Arti-
cle 98.2 of the Statute allows for narrow limitations on the duties of States
Parties to cooperate with the ICC, specifying that the Court may not pro-
ceed with a request for surrender of a person where this would "require the
requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under interna-
tional agreements" without the consent of that state. The provision was
included to deal with situations where states' existing obligations under
international law-such as under Status of Forces agreements-might con-
flict with the obligations they are taking on by becoming party to the Rome
Statute. Its use to obtain blanket exemptions for all nationals of a particu-
lar state was not contemplated, and the U.S. attempt to use the provision
for that purpose is, like its purported reliance on Article 16, erroneous.
The European Union, in September 2002, issued guidelines for its
member states to use "when considering the necessity and scope of possi-
ble agreements or arrangements in responding to the United States' propo-
sal."'44  The guidelines state categorically that: "Entering into US
agreements-as presently drafted-would be inconsistent with ICC States
Parties' obligations with regard to the ICC Statute and may be inconsistent
with other international agreements to which ICC States Parties are Par-
ties."'4 5 Similarly, a Legal Opinion obtained by the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights from prominent international lawyers, including James
43. Press Release, Explanation of Vote and Remarks by Ambassador John D. Negro-
pante, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, following the vote on UN
Security Council Resolution 1422 on the International Criminal Court at the Security
Council Stake-Out, U.S. Mission to the U.N. Press Release no. 92(02) (July 12, 2002),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/02print_.098.htm.
44. Draft Conclusions on the ICC, supra note 31.
45. Criticism by the European Union, non-governmental organizations and others
has focused in particular on the wide scope of persons that are covered by the agree-
ments. Whereas Status of Forces Agreements cover currently serving military and
related civilian personnel sent for a specific military purpose and address only crimes
committed on the territory of the "receiving State," the agreements sought by the U.S. are
much wider, covering "current or former government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals" and without regard to where the crime
occurred. A second major concern is that the agreements can result in persons alleged
to have committed grave international crimes escaping justice, and will therefore lead to
impunity.
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Crawford, who is a member of the International Law Commission and
drafted the first version of the Rome Statute, concludes that: "It is inconsis-
tent with the object and purpose of the ICC Statute for a State Party to enter
into or apply a bilateral non-surrender agreement if the purpose or effect of
doing so would be to provide impunity to a person credibly suspected of
having committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC," and that
similar considerations would apply to signatories. 46
The Bush Administration has gone to extraordinary lengths to pres-
sure states into signing these impunity agreements. It has sustained a
relentless diplomatic campaign directed at all capitals of the world that has
included threats to cut economic aid and has exhausted considerable U.S.
political capital. One stick used to beat refuseniks is the ASPA. As well as
prohibiting the U.S. from cooperating with the ICC, the Act provides that
states that are parties to the ICC Treaty and have not signed an agreement
with the U.S. by July 1, 2003, may have their military assistance sus-
pended. The Act itself provides exceptions for NATO members and major
non-NATO allies and allows the President to issue waivers if in the national
interest of the U.S.
The Act has been applied to the letter. The U.S. froze military aid to
35 countries after they failed to meet the July 1, 2003 signing deadline. As
of September 2003, 32 states were being sanctioned, and a total of $89.28
million in military assistance funds was set to be withheld in the financial
year 2004. 4 7 The list of countries that have refused to sign agreements on
principle includes many of the U.S.'s closest allies, but the wealthiest of
those are protected by the automatic waiver for NATO members and other
key allies. It is smaller and weaker states that are most vulnerable, and
they face both political and economic pressure that has in some cases been
simply impossible to resist. Former Canadian Foreign Affairs minister
Lloyd Axworthy remarked: "It is the first time I have even seen political or
economic sanctions imposed on countries that want to uphold the rule of
law." 4
8
V. The Implications of U.S. Unilateralism
U.S. objections to the ICC have been countered time and time again by
the Court's supporters. A leading U.S. concern-the ICC's jurisdiction
over nationals of non-States Parties-is out of step with international law.
Other claims the Administration makes include the lack of accountability
of the Prosecutor, the usurpation of the role of the U.N. Security Council,
46. James Crawford et al., In the Matter of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court And In the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States Under
Article 98(2) of the Statute (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/interna-
tional.justice/Art98-061403.pdf.
47. See World Federalist Association, What is at Stake? How Sanctions will Affect
U.S. Allies, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/otherissues/
impunityart98/FS-WICC-BlAanecdotes.pdf.
48. Kim Housego, Columbia Armies Enlist Children, A.P. Online, Sept. 18, 2003.
More than 11,000 children fight in Colombia's armed conflict.
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and the lack of due process guarantees.4 9 All of these are unfounded. The
Prosecutor cannot even begin an investigation without the approval of the
Pre-Trial Chamber and is accountable both to the Court itself and to the
Assembly of States Parties-now 92 States. Careful consideration was
given during the negotiations to what should be an appropriate role for the
Security Council, so as to ensure on the one hand that the ICC would not
interfere with the Council's role in relation to threats to international peace
and security while on the other, preserving the independence of the ICC.
The balance struck was that the Security Council will be able to refer cases
to the ICC so that the ICC will be one tool the Council can use when exer-
cising its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. On the other
hand, in recognition of the fact that there may be circumstances in which
independent action by the ICC to pursue cases during sensitive negotiation
of peace treaties could derail a peace process, the Rome Statute allows the
Security Council to defer ICC proceedings for a year. As regards the criti-
cisms of due process guarantees, both participating states, including the
U.S., and human rights organizations insisted that the Rome Statute
include fundamental safeguards including the presumption of innocence, a
speedy and public trial, counsel of one's choice, privilege against self-
incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the exclusion of ille-
gally-obtained evidence.
One of the most damaging aspects of the U.S. campaign against the
ICC is the assertion of exceptionalism: because of the U.S.'s special role in
the world, the argument goes, its military forces spread across the globe are
uniquely exposed to politically motivated prosecutions. The U.S.'s closest
allies have frequently expressed confusion and frustration that the U.S.
claims a special place for itself and rejects a legal regime to which they
themselves are prepared to submit themselves. They counter that the U.S.
concerns are misplaced and that the way to deal with them is to create
enough filters and safeguards to ensure that there is no possibility of politi-
cally motivated investigations or prosecutions. These were put in place
during the negotiation of the Statute, and include the checks on the role of
the Prosecutor by a Pre-Trial Chamber already mentioned and stringent
admissibility requirements. Further, the court is able to target only the
most serious crimes and can only act where states are themselves either
unable or unwilling to do so. Any state with a strong legal system that
investigates allegations in good faith is extremely unlikely to find itself the
subject of scrutiny by the ICC's Prosecutor. The response of the Prosecutor
to complaints submitted to the court relating to actions of members of the
coalition forces in Iraq that are parties to the Rome Statute, such as the UK,
illustrates that point. The Prosecutor's view was that these types of com-
plaints should be investigated in the UK. 50
49. Jennifer Elsea, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court, Report
for Congress, Updated Sept. 3, 2002, Library of Congress, Report RL31495, available at
http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RL31495.pdf.
50. Press Release, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, Communications Received
by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (July 16, 2003) (The Hague).
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Yet, the U.S. insistence on exceptionalism is extremely damaging. If
one state can argue for special treatment, why can't others? The message
that emerges is that justice is for some but not for all. This undermines the
principles of the rule of law and of equality before the law that are essen-
tial. If a key purpose of the ICC is to make future tyrants think they cannot
get away with it, why will they hold back if they see the international com-
munity divided over the principal enforcement mechanism? And if states
are wavering over whether or not to become party to the ICC, seeing others
asserting that they are above the law will only encourage a cynical attitude
towards an institution that is founded on the assertion of equality before
the law. While the ICC regime aims to uphold a single standard for all
aimed at preventing and deterring the worst of crimes, the U.S. is working
against it by seeking to create immunity for entire classes of persons. The
U.S. campaign has therefore been extremely damaging to the ICC itself, as
it seeks to establish itself as a major new international institution.
A second major aspect of the U.S. assault on the ICC is that it has
caused the U.S. to work directly against the trend towards stronger interna-
tional cooperation to combat impunity for atrocities. The U.S. is in danger
of placing itself outside the global consensus that has emerged during the
past half century through working together to ensure that there is no safe
haven for those who commit the worst of crimes. This consensus rests not
only on the International Criminal Court but also other important pillars
such as the principle aut dedere aut judicare. The attempt as seen in the
Security Council resolution on Liberia to oust these forms of jurisdiction is
particularly troubling. A third concern is the damage done to the function-
ing of the international legal order by the abuse of the powers of the Secur-
ity Council and attempts to override not only the Rome Statute but also
other international law. In so doing, the U.S. has been ready to jeopardize
crucial international peacekeeping efforts in order to get its way. In this
regard the U.S. drive to achieve its objectives has been shortsighted and has
come at considerable legal and political costs, both immediate and long
term.
Finally, the U.S. campaign against the ICC has been conducted at
enormous cost to the country. It has created considerable resentment
among friends and foes alike. The U.S. is almost alone in its views on the
ICC; states like China and Russia, though not yet themselves parties to the
ICC Treaty, regularly speak out in support of the ICC in the face of U.S.
assaults on the court.
Conclusion
Instead of supporting the development of this new global institution
that was set up to ensure perpetrators of the worst atrocities do not escape
justice, which would be consistent with what the U.S. stood for at Nurem-
berg, the Bush Administration has been putting its considerable muscle
into efforts to make sure no U.S. citizen could ever come before the new
ICC. The assault on the ICC is often given as an example of the Bush
Administration disengaging from international institutions and increasing
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unilateralism. But the approach to the ICC has gone beyond disengage-
ment. The actions over the past two years demonstrate a concerted attempt
to undermine and destroy the court, some of the implications of which
have been explored above, with implications for the very foundations of
international law and the international political system as well as for the
ICC itself.
Meanwhile, as the new ICC Prosecutor begins his work, interesting
parallels are already developing with international efforts to combat terror-
ism. In the field of terrorism, it is notable that whereas states have not
even been able to agree on a definition of terrorism, they have concluded
an International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Ter-
rorism.5 1 In the very first case he is looking at, Moreno Ocampo is looking
into international money flows as part of his strategy for dealing with
crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, looking in
particular at businesses that trade weapons in exchange for gold and
diamonds. In other words, he is aiming to cut off the financing that is
fueling the crimes, just as has become the practice in relation to terrorism.
A series of U.N. reports have exposed the fact that companies in 25 coun-
tries, including the U.S., have helped fund the crimes through the illegal
export of natural resources and trade in arms. Ocampo has said the killing
will only stop when this illegal business activity stops.
There are many other overlaps between the fight against serious
human rights crimes and the fight against terrorism. In the post 9/11
world, the U.S. has taken a cavalier attitude towards extraterritorial reach
in the name of combating terrorism. In doing so, many believe it has over-
stepped the boundaries of what is permissible under international law.
But at the same time, the U.S. has failed to take the opportunity to play its
full role in combating other sorts of crimes of international concern that
mainly affect others. Ironically, there is also the very real possibility that
the U.S. attacks on the ICC may have actually constrained its ability to
fight terrorism. In angering its allies, and in suspending aid-as a sanction
for refusing to sign impunity agreements relating to the ICC-even to coun-
tries that are partners in fighting terrorism, the U.S. has harmed its own
interests.
While there may be disagreements over the precise definition of tor-
ture, or what is a legitimate target in war, few would disagree that it is
everyone's concern if a state commits mass murder or torture against its
own citizens or those of another country. The behavior of the Bush Admin-
istration towards the ICC should raise serious questions for U.S. citizens: is
it more in the national interest for the government to work to ensure that
fundamental principles of the rule of law and equality are upheld and
gross violators of human rights are brought to justice, or for it to rail obses-
sively against U.S. nationals being treated just like anyone else?
51. G.A. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/Res/
54/109 (Concluded in New York, 2000), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
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